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The nature of responsibility has always presented a problem to philos-
ophers. Although it is used implicitly everyday, the concept is complex and elu-
sive. The premise that individuals should be held responsible for their conduct
is at the base of the criminal law; generally, legal responsibility refers to the
offender's liability to be tried, to be convicted, to be punished.' Traditionally,
legal insanity as defined by the Criminal Code2 has been the chief exception
to this principle. An individual may be held, due to his mental condition,
to be totally lacking of responsibility for his actions; and under such circum-
stances, it is deemed that the guilty mind cannot be present. Contrary to
what the established rules of Canadian criminal law suggest, however, re-
sponsibility is not an all or nothing quality. Rather, just as there are several
shadings of mental stability, there are many degrees of responsibility for
crime. Psychiatrists have recognized that there is no sharp division between
soundness and unsoundness of mind. Wherever one draws the line, there are
bound to be some individuals who, owing to their mental infirmity, are not
wholly responsible for their actions.3 In the past few decades the Canadian
courts have recognized this and have found the need to introduce into the
criminal law a new test-that of partial or diminished responsibility.
The concept of diminished responsibility in Canadian criminal law raises
0 Copyright, 1981, Mark Gannage.
* Mr. Gannage is a member of the 1981 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law
School. This paper was the winner of the 1981 Osgoode Hall Law Journal Student
Writing Competition.
'Hill, Responsibility and the Mentally Abnormal Offender (1976-79), 14 J. of the
Soc'y of Pub. Teachers of L. 81 at 81-83.
2 Section 16 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 [hereinafter the Code]
reads:
(1) No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an act or omission
on his part while he was insane.
(2) For the purposes of this section a person is insane when he is in a state of
natural imbecility or has a disease of the mind to an extent that renders him
incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of an act or omission or c
knowing that an act or omission is wrong.
(3) A person who has specific delusions, but is in other respects sane, shall not
be acquitted on the ground of insanity unless the delusions caused him to
believe in the existence of a state of things that, if it existed, would have
justified or excused his act or omission.
(4) Every one shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to be and to have
been sane.
3 Cassels, Diminished Responsibility (1964), 7 Can. Bar J. 8 at 25.
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several issues. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to investigate all the
questions surrounding this matter.4 Specifically, this study will look at the
case law to illustrate that the doctrine exists in Canada. For the purposes of
understanding and comparison, the doctrine as it stands in Scotland and
England, including its origin, development, definition and scope, will first be
considered. Next, several Canadian cases will be analyzed in order to trace
the nature and growth of the concept. There will be an investigation of some
of the reasons for the development in Canada of the diminished responsibility
doctrine and the various approaches revealed by the cases. Finally, the
question whether the defence of diminished responsibility should be codified
will be discussed from the viewpoint of certainty, uniformity and fairness.
II. DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY IN SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND
A. Origin and Development
The doctrine of diminished responsibility originated over one hundred
years ago in the law of Scotland. As a judicial creation, the concept that
"weakness of mind" can alter the character of a criminal offence was first
recognized by Lord Deas in H.M. Advocate v. Dingwall.5 The accused in
that case was charged with murdering his wife after he had consumed a
substantial quantity of whiskey. It was established that Dingwall's mind had
been weakened by repeated attacks of delirium tremens and that he had
likely suffered from epileptic fits. In charging the jury, Lord Deas instructed
that the defences of insanity and drunkenness were untenable, but that a
verdict of culpable homicide (manslaughter) could be returned if weakness
of the mind was found. According to his Lordship:
The state of mind of the prisoner might be an extenuating circumstance although
not such as to warrant an acquittal on the ground of insanity; and he [the trial
judge] therefore could not exclude it from the consideration of the jury here,
along with the whole other circumstances in making up their minds whether, if
responsible to the law at all, the prisoner was to be held guilty of murder or
culpable homicide. 0
The jury returned a verdict of manslaughter and the accused was sentenced
to ten years imprisonment.
Although the doctrine of diminished responsibility was originally limited
4 This paper adopts a practical rather than a normative approach; that is, the cen-
tral question is whether the concept of diminished responsibility exists in Canada and
not whether it should exist. No attempt will be made to construct an ideal model of
criminal responsibility. See Topp, A Concept of Diminished Responsibility for Canadian
Criminal Law (1975), 33 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 205 at 213-15. Also, the issue of disposi-
tion will not be addressed. Perhaps it would be beneficial to have separate criteria in
determining each of criminal responsibility and disposition, but to investigate this com-
plex issue is beyond the scope of this paper. There will be no analysis of the meaning,
scope and application of section 16 and the rash of criticism of it. Finally, although
there are various established defences of diminished responsibility in Canadian criminal
law, such as infanticide, provocation and drunkenness, the focus here is on the specific
defence based on some mental abnormality short of insanity.
5 (1867), 5 Irv. 466, 4 S.L.R. 249 (Ct. Just.).
6 Id. at 479-80.
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to the crime of murder, the case of H.M. Advocate v. M'Lean7 extended
the concept to lesser crimes. In that case, the accused was convicted of
housebreaking but the jury recommended leniency due to his apparent im-
becility.
The Homicide Act, 19578 introduced diminished responsibility to Eng-
lish law. Section 2(1) of the Act declares,
Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be con-
victed of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether
arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any
inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his
mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the
killing.
The burden of proving the defence on a balance of probability rests on the
defendant, according to section 2(2). Under section 2(3), the defence of
diminished responsibility reduces the crime from murder to manslaughter,
which means that the judge has a wide range of discretion as to sentencing.
The statute is intended to provide for mitigation of punishment in murder
cases where the accused is mentally disordered but not insane.
B. Definition and Scope
Framing a statutory definition of diminished responsibility to satisfy
both psychiatrists and lawyers is difficult. Indeed, the draftsmen of the
Homicide Act have been criticized for using certain ill-chosen words in sec-
tion 2(1). In particular it has been pointed out that "mental responsibility"
is an inapt phrase since responsibility is a legal or ethical notion and not a
clinical fact about a patient which a doctor can examine and assess., More-
over, the use of the word "substantial" compounds the difficulty since the
question of substantial impairment involves a subjective estimation and not
one of medical science.10
Ultimately, a finding of diminished responsibility is a question of fact to
be decided by the jury. With this in mind, the courts in Scotland and Eng-
land approve of directions telling the jury that what must be established is a
mental state "bordering on insanity, although not reaching it; a mind so
affected that the responsibility is diminished from full responsibility to par-
tial responsibility"" or "not quite mad but a border-line case" us
Lord Parker C.J. interpreted section 2(1) in R. v. Byrne:
"Abnormality of mind".., means a state of mind so different from that of
7 (1876), 3 Coup. 334.
8 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Homicide Act].
9 Supra note 1, at 88. See also, Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (London:
Stevens & Sons, 1978) at 624.
10 Williams, id.
11 H.M. Advocate v. Savage, [1923] S.C.J. 49 at 51, 61 S.L.T. 13 at 13 per Clerk
L.J. (Ct. Just.).
12 R. v. Spriggs, [1958] 1 Q.B. 270 at 276, [1958] 2 W.L.R. 162 at 167, [1958] 1
All E.R. 300 at 304 per Lord Goddard L.J. (C.C.A.).
1981]
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ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal. It
appears to us to be wide enough to cover the mind's activities in all its aspects,
not only the perception of physical acts and matters and the ability to form a
rational judgment whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise
will-power to control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment.13
The types of mental condition that fall within the doctrine of diminished
responsibility are difficult to classify. The case law suggests, however, that
where there is clear evidence of mental abnormality, whether it be psychosis,
epilepsy, subnormality or in some instances neurosis, a plea of diminished
responsibility will be accepted. In the case of psychopathy it seems unlikely
that a plea of diminished responsibility will be allowed. But, if there is evi-
dence of other mental abnormality along with the psychopathic disorder,
there is a good chance that the verdict will be reduced to one of man-
slaughter.1 4 Clearly the courts in Scotland and England have indicated a
desire, based on implicit policy grounds, to restrict the ambit of mental weak-
nesses that fall within the diminished responsibility category. For instance,
in H.M. Advocate v. Braithwaite'3 Lord Cooper made the important qualifi-
cation:
that it will not suffice in law for the purpose of this defence of diminished re-
sponsibility merely to show that an accused person has a very short temper, or
is unusually excitable and lacking in self-control. The world would be a very
convenient place for criminals and a very dangerous place for other people, if
that were the law.10
Ultimately, as Williams points out, the defence of diminished responsibility
may often be interpreted in accordance with the morality of the case rather
than as an application of psychiatric concepts.1
7
III. DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY IN CANADA
Leggett observes that "diminished responsibility does not exist [in
Canada]. Perhaps the better terminology might be that it does not exist in so
many words."' 8 There is no general statutory provision in Canada that sets
out this concept. There are a number of Canadian cases decided in the past
few decades, however, that indicate a basis for this doctrine. An examination
of these cases reveals that an accused may be able to advance a defence
based on a lack of intent resulting from a mental disorder not amounting to
the Code's definition of insanity. It is essential to trace the development of
these cases.
Traditionally, the de facto rule of criminal responsibility in Canadian
law has been that a man is presumed to intend the natural or probable con-
13 [1960] 2 Q.B. 396 at 403, [1960] 3 W.L.R. 440 at 443-44, [1960] 3 All E.R.
1 at 4 (C.C.A.).
14 Whitlock, Criminal Responsibility and Mental Illness (London: Butterworths,
1963) at 96-97.
15 [1945] S.C.J. 55 at 57-58, [1944] S.N. 70, [1945] S.L.T. 209 (Ct. Just.).
161d.
17 Williams, supra note 9, at 629.
18 Leggett, "Diminished Responsibility," Crown's Newsletter (Ontario: Crown At-
torney's Association, September, 1977) at 2.
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sequences of his acts unless he clearly falls within a recognized defence such
as insanity or intoxication.' 9 This common law maxim has been held in
recent years to be misleading 0 and fallacious. 21 Lord Denning stated in
Hosegood v. Hosegood that it was merely a "proposition of ordinary good
sense" and that "if on all the facts of the case it is not the correct inference,
then it should not be drawn. 22 In 1956, Mr. Justice Roach imported this
statement into Ontario law in R. v. Giannotti.23 More recently, the Ontario
Court of Appeal held in R. v. Ortt-4 that the word presumption should be
avoided altogether and that juries should be told that they may infer the
intent required for a conviction if it is supported by the facts of the case.
The maxim has been seen as no more than a rule of common sense that is to
be used as an aid in determining what was in a particular man's mind.
Martin comments that the rule to be followed in determining what was
present in this accused's mind is that one must take the person as he is; if he
is a borderline mental defective then that will have a bearing on whether or
not he really did foresee the consequences of what he was doing.25 Indeed,
the view expressed by Martin underlines the whole question of diminished
responsibility and will be considered further in the latter part of this paper.
A statutory exception to the traditional common law presumption exists
with respect to the offence of infanticide.
The Code defines infanticide in the following terms:
A female person commits infanticide when by a wilful act or omission she causes
the death of her newly-born child, if at the time of the act or omission she is not
fully recovered from the effects of giving birth to the child and by reason thereof
or of the effect of lactation consequent on the birth of the child her mind is then
disturbed.
2 6
This section, in conjunction with section 590, is significant in that it reveals
a legislative recognition of diminished responsibility as being a mitigating
factor in reducing what would normally be murder to infanticide. In contrast
to the mandatory life sentence attached to murder, the punishment for in-
fanticide is no more than five years.
A. The Early Cases
The first reported decision in Canada in which the doctrine of dimin-
ished responsibility was raised is the 1926 case of Bigaouette v. The King.27
19 Martin, Insanity as a Defence (1965-66), 8 Crim. L.Q. 240 at 256-57.
20 Vallance v. The Queen (1961), 108 C.L.R. 56 at 82 (H.C. of Aust.); R. v.
Mulligan (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 270 at 274-75, 26 C.R.N.S. 179 at 184-85 (Ont.
C.A.), afl'd [1977] 1 S.C.R. 612.
21 Supra note 19, at 257.
22 (1950), 66(1) T.L.R. 735 at 738 (CA.).
23 [1956] O.R. 349 at 364, 115 C.C.C. 203 at 213, 23 C.R. 259 at 269 (C.A.).
24 [1969] 1 O.R. 461 at 463, [1970] 1 C.C.C. 223 at 225, (1968) 6 C.R.N.S. 233
at 235 (C.A.).
25 Supra note 19, at 255-56. See also, Carter, Annotation (1967), 1 C.R.N.S. 299
at 301.
26 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 216.
27 (1926), 46 C.C.C. 311 (Que. K.B.) rev'd on other grounds, [1927] S.C.R. 112.
1981]
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In that case the Quebec King's Bench, Appeal Court dealt with an appeal
against a conviction of murder. Greenshields J. stated that he did not under-
stand the defence counsel's submission that "'[the trial judge] confounded
the plea of insanity with that of mental debility, rendering the accused in-
capable of committing the act of which he is accused.' "28 There was no psy-
chiatric evidence provided on the accused's behalf. The appeal judge held:
It is the first time that it has, to my knowledge, been suggested, that mental
debility, not amounting to insanity or degeneracy, falling short of irresponsibility,
is a defence to a criminal charge. It is probably true that a large proportion of
criminals are drawn from the mentally weak and the degenerate. A person en-
dowed with a strong mentality and a vigorous, active, moral sense, as a rule, is
more unlikely to become a criminal than the degenerate and the mentally weak.
It may be the crime is committed because he is mentally weak and morally
degenerate, but, nevertheless, he is a criminal.2 9
Greenshields J. supported his position by quoting two authorities, neither of
which dealt with the point counsel was trying to make.30 One case concerned
uncontrollable impulse and the other dealt with insanity.31 Indeed, Bigaouette
reveals not only a rejection of the concept of diminished responsibility, but
also a lack of understanding of its essence. It is submitted that because of this
fundamental lack of understanding the case is not a strong authority for the
proposition that diminished responsibility does not exist in Canadian law.
The next case that raised a mens rea defence based upon mental dis-
order short of insanity was R. v. Flett.32 The accused was convicted at trial
of assault with intent to rob. Several psychiatrists had testified that Flett
suffered from "'infective exhaustive psychosis.' "33 On appeal, defence coun-
sel submitted the accused's mental condition had affedted his capacity to
form the specific intent to rob.34 Sloan J.A. stated:
I do not consider it necessary to reach any conclusion as to whether or not the
theory advanced by him [defence counsel] is good in law as a defence.., there is
no evidence to support the suggested theory.... .3
Hence, the British Columbia Court of Appeal left open the question whether
the result would have been different if there had been some evidence to
support a diminished responsibility position. At the same time, however, the
Court implicitly indicated a willingness to entertain the submission, and un-
like the Court in Bigaouette, it understood the essence of the plea.30
In Regina v. Hoodley,37 two psychiatrists testified that the accused, who
28 Id. at 316 (C.C.C.).
29 Id. at 317.
30 Mewett and Manning, Criminal Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978) at 214.
31 Supra note 27, at 324: referring to R. v. Creighton (1908), 14 C.C.C. 349 (Ont.
H.C.); R. v. Jessamine (1912), 19 C.C.C. 214, 1 D.L.R. 285 (Ont. C.A.).
32 [1943] 2 D.L.R. 656, [1943) 1 W.W.R. 672, 79 C.C.C. 183 (B.C.C.A.).
33Id. at 660 (D.L.R.), 676 (W.W.R.), 187 (C.C.C.).
34 Id. at 661 (D.L.R.), 677-78 (W.W.R.), 188 (C.C.C.).
35Id. at 661-62 (D.L.R.), 678 (W.W.R.), 187 (C.C.C.).
386 Supra note 30.
37 (1955), 15 W.W.R. 397, 111 C.C.C. 210, 21 C.R. 281 (B.C.C.A.).
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was charged with murder, was an aggressive psychopath. There was no evi-
dence, however, that the accused suffered from mental disease or was affected
by any mental deficiency to weaken his mental capacity. On behalf of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal, O'Halloran J.A. held:
Appellant's counsel has asked this Court to hold the learned Judge did not in-
struct the jury adequately upon s. 259(b) to include what was described as the
Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility occasioned by mental abnormality.
But even if such a doctrine is available in Canada (and I refrain now from
indicating a view one way or the other) in my judgment no foundation has been
laid in this case for its application: see R. v. Flett, 79 Can. C.C. 183 .... 8
Thus, the Court again left the issue open. Significantly, the Court's finding of
no evidence of mental abnormality is consistent with the law of Scotland and
England where it has been noted that an aggressive psychopath would likely
be unable to plead diminished responsibility.
B. More v. The Queen: The Breakthrough
The first case in Canada to directly. confront the question of intent and
mental disorder short of insanity was More v. The Queen.8 9 Whereas some
prior Canadian decisions had indicated a reluctance, based upon the nature
of the evidence presented, to adopt the doctrine of diminished responsibility,
the Supreme Court in More took a novel approach. There was no mention
of specific intent, nor was an emphasis placed on the need for an incapacity
in the accused to perform the mental processes involved in the crime. Rather,
the jury was asked to consider only whether the defendant, who was charged
with capital murder punishable by death, had in fact planned and deliber-
ated.40 Because of its powerful impact on the development of subsequent
case law and the concept of diminished responsibility in Canada, More v.
The Queen should be examined in some detail.
The accused was charged with the capital murder of his wife. Medical
evidence established that More was suffering from "depressive psychosis."
This mental condition is characterized by feelings of hopelessness and despair
and an impaired ability to reason, think or decide even inconsequential mat-
ters. The defence of insanity was expressly disclaimed. It was contended that
the medical evidence was adduced to assist the jury in deciding whether the
accused's action in pulling the trigger was a deliberate act. The trial judge
directed the jury that the evidence of experts was of slight weight. At his first
trial More was convicted of capital murder. Without citing authorities, the
Supreme Court ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial judge had
misdirected the jury with regard to the "deliberate nature" of the killing.
Mr. Justice Cartwright, using words often quoted in subsequent cases, wrote
for the majority:
The evidence of the two doctors and particularly that of Dr. Adamson ... that
in his opinion, at the critical moment the appellant was suffering from a depres-
3s Id. at 400 (W.W.R.), 213 (C.C.C.), 284 (C.R.).
a9 [1963] S.C.R. 522, 41 D.L.R. (2d) 380, [1963] 3 C.C.C. 289.
40 Reynolds, MENS REA and Mental Disorder (1979), 37 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 187
at 200.
19811
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sive psychosis resulting in 'impairment of the ability to decide even inconse-
quential things, inability to make a decision in a normal kind of a way' would
have a direct bearing on the question whether the appellant's act was deliberate
in the sense defined above [i.e. 'considered, not impulsive']; its weight was a
matter for the jury.
41
Fauteux J. (Taschereau C.J.C. concurring) wrote the dissenting judg-
ment and concluded that impairment of mental capacity short of insanity was
not a defence to capital murder.42 To hold otherwise, as the majority had
done, would be to establish a concept of diminished responsibility in Canada.
Fauteux J. specifically dealt with the doctrine, briefly reviewed the English
and American positions and rejected it. He reasoned that it was improbable
that Parliament had intended such a substantial change in the law in the
absence of an explicit alteration. The failure of the majority to agree with
him, however, suggests that the diminished responsibility concept was rec-
ognized in More .
43
In his comment on More, Macdonald argues that the acceptance of the
medical evidence does not introduce into our law the concept of diminished
responsibility in the sense defined by the British Homicide ACt.44 Rather, he
contends that such evidence, by negating the element of deliberateness, func-
tions in a manner internal to the charge of capital (now first degree) 45 mur-
der itself; by contrast, in Britain a plea of diminished responsibility involves
the external function of such evidence.40 This distinction is confusing and
artificial. Certainly in the British statute the abnormality of mind resulting in
a substantial impairment of mental responsibility is instrumental in negating
the requisite intent to murder. Similarly, in Canada planning and delibera-
tion are necessary elements of capital (now first degree) murder. In both
cases, the evidence can be said to operate in a manner internal to the charge
itself although the required degrees of mens rea may differ. Furthermore, the
evidence in both cases may be said to function externally in that it relates
to the state of mind and hence, to the responsibility of the particular accused.
In addition, and contrary to Macdonald's suggestion,47 Cartwright J.'s con-
tention in More that there is no danger of affecting the interpretation of the
Code's insanity defence does not mean that the diminished responsibility
doctrine has not been introduced. The introduction of section 2 of the
Homicide Act certainly did not affect the interpretation of the M'Naghten,"
rules, the British equivalent to the Canadian insanity defence.
Contrary to Macdonald's view, the underlying concepts of More and
section 2 of the Homicide Act coincide. Although the former addresses the
41 Supra note 39, at 535 (S.C.R.), 382 (D.L.R.), 291 (C.C.C.).
42 Id. at 533 (S.C.R.), 391 (D.L.R.), 300 (C.C.C.).
4 3 Supra note 30, at 218.
44 Macdonald, More v. The Queen (1965), 23 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 152 at 153-54.
45 The term "first degree" appeared for the first time in the Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act (No. 2), 1976, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 105, s. 214.
46 Supra note 44, at 154.
47 Id.
48 (1843), 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 E.R. 718 (H.L.).
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issue of reducing capital murder to non-capital murder, the provision in the
English statute is concerned with the murder-manslaughter dichotomy. Both
stand for the principle, however, that mental abnormality short of insanity
may diminish the seriousness of the offence. Moreover, the two elements of the
defence of diminished responsibility, as defined in section 2 of the Homicide
Act, can be found in More. There was evidence of an abnormality of mind and
a resulting substantial impairment of mental responsibility. To be sure, depres-
sive psychosis is a type of mental condition that has been held to fall within
the doctrine of diminished responsibility in England and Scotland.
The decision in More established another milestone in the field of Ca-
nadian criminal law. In permitting an accused to introduce psychiatric evi-
dence of the kind presented in More, the Supreme Court has shown a much
greater appreciation of psychiatric and psychological theories than ever be-
fore. As Nemiroff suggests: "[t]he Court, in effect, has stated that what on
the surface may appear to be a deliberate act may in fact not be deliberate
by virtue of an accused's mental deficiencies. '49 This outlook defies the
common law maxim of presumed intent discussed previously.
C. The Aftermath
It is essential to examine the extent to which the principle in More has
been applied or expanded in subsequent Canadian cases. Such an investiga-
tion will aid in assessing the validity of Topp's statement that "notwithstand-
ing the Supreme Court decision in Hore, there seems to be a trend towards
disallowing diminished responsibility as a defence." 50
Shortly after More the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of
diminished responsibility in McMartin v. The Queen.51 As in More, medical
evidence of a mental disorder not amounting to insanity was relied upon by
defence counsel to support the submission that the crime, if committed by
the accused, was non-capital rather than capital murder. The Court held that
the Court of Appeal had erred in rejecting the evidence of a mental deficien-
cy which made McMartin prone to impulsive and unpredictable behaviour.
With explicit reference to the judgment in More, Ritchie J. wrote:
Under all the circumstances, it appears to me that the evidence of Dr. Tyhurst,
like that of the doctors in More v. The Queen ... might have caused the jury 'to
regard it as more probable that the accused's final act was prompted by sudden
impulse rather than by consideration!
For these reasons I am of opinion that the evidence of Dr. Tyhurst should
have been admitted ....
In my opinion, without the evidence of the appellant's mental history and
condition, it cannot be said that all the circumstances bearing on the question of
whether the murder was planned and deliberate have been passed upon by a
jury...
-52
49 Nemiroff, Case and Comment: More v. The Queen (1965), 11 McGill L.J. 174
at 177.
5o Topp, supra note 4, at 210.
51 [1964] S.C.R. 484, 46 D.L.R. (2d) 372, 43 C.R. 403.
52 Id. at 495 (S.C.R.), 383 (D.L.R.), 413-14 (C.R.).
1981]
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The reasoning in both More and McMartin was that "since 'planned and
deliberate' means 'considered not impulsive', psychiatric evidence to show
that the accused was prone to impulsive actions, or that his judgmental facul-
ties were impaired was relevant to the issue of whether he had the required
mental element. '53 R. v. Mitchell 4 was decided shortly after McMartin and
it, too, applied this reasoning. Spence J. wrote:
I am of the opinion that the judgments in these two cases have as their ratio
decidendi the principle that in determining whether the accused committed the
crime of capital murder in that it was 'planned and deliberate on the part of such
person' the jury should have available and should be directed to consider all the
circumstances including not only the evidence of the accused's actions but of his
condition, his state of mind.. .55
More, McMartin and Mitchell clearly import some concept of dimin-
ished responsibility into the law of capital murder as it existed in the early
Sixties. Reynolds maintains that the decisions in More and McMartin "repre-
sent a choice by the Supreme Court of Canada to embark on one possible
road rather than another, and the view of inens rea which their choice entails
cannot rationally be confined to cases involving capital punishment or first
degree murder." 56 Certainly the case of R. v. Blackmore57 supports this view.
In that case the accused was charged with non-capital murder of a small
child. There was evidence that Blackmore suffered from reactive depression
which could lead him to strike out against almost anything or anybody. Cit-
ing McMartin, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that this evidence
should have been placed before the jury in order that they could have con-
sidered whether the accused, suffering from such a disorder of the mind and
with all the other circumstances, had the intent to cause bodily harm which
he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether death ensued or
not. The question whether the decision in Blackmore views a mental defici-
ency short of insanity as negativing specific intent, or as affecting nens rea
generally, is subject to debate. Carter submits that it is clear from Blackmore
that a mental disorder not amounting to insanity is sufficient to affect the
accused's capacity to form the necessary specific intent to kill or cause bodily
harm which he knows is likely to cause death.58 As Reynolds observes, how-
ever, there is no mention of specific intent in the case. The decision indicates
the Court felt that if the mental element for murder was not found, then a
conviction for manslaughter would result. On the other hand, Reynolds notes
that the facts in this case clearly showed that the accused had intended to
cause unlawful bodily harm; thus, the Court was not invoking a "partial de-
fence" like drunkenness which would not apply to a general intent offence.50
The principal issue raised here will be further considered in the latter part
of this analysis.
53 Supra note 40, at 194.
54 [1964] S.C.R. 471, 46 D.L.R. (2d) 384, 43 C.R. 391.
55 Id. at 474-75 (S.C.R.), 390 (D.L.R.), 393 (C.R.).
5 6 Supra note 40, at 195.
57 (1967), 53 M.P.R. 141, 1 C.R.N.S. 286 (N.S.C.A.).
58 Carter, supra note 25.
59 Supra note 40, at 200.
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Blackmore is significant in that it extends the diminished responsibility
concept in Canadian law beyond the offence of capital, or first degree, mur-
der. It establishes the principle that evidence of mental disorder short of
insanity is relevant and admissible to raise doubt about a lesser degree of
mens rea than the highest form of "planned and deliberate" required to
prove capital murder. In effect, the decision in Blackmore parallels section 2
of the Homicide Act for it holds that in certain circumstances abnormality
of mind may reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter. It will become
evident that several subsequent Canadian cases have confirmed this prin-
ciple.
D. Recent Cases
The decisions of Canadian courts in the past decade have exhibited
diverse attitudes toward the question of diminished responsibility. Whereas
some cases have embraced the concept, or a concept similar to it, others have
shown a reluctance to accept it. Some of the recent cases will now be ex-
amined in a chronological order.
R. v. MulliganO is cited by Topp to support his view that the trend in
Canada is towards disallowing diminished responsibility as a defence.61
Indeed, in Mulligan the doctrine was not invoked, although there was a sug-
gestion that it would have been had the facts been different. During the trial
of the accused for second degree murder, a psychiatrist testified that at the
time of the stabbing, the accused had an acute "dissociative reaction" caused
by a combination of psychological stress and alcohol. This order was said to
have constituted a disease of the mind as defined by the Code because the
accused could not form the necessary intent or be sensitively aware of the
nature and consequences of his action. On appeal the defence argued that
the trial judge had failed to relate the evidence as to mental state to the issue
of necessary intent. Martin J.A., writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal
stated:
I do not consider that there was non-direction on the part of the learned trial
Judge by reason of his failure to relate the evidence of the accused's emotional
state separately to the issue of intent .... There was not in this case any mental
disorder or defect not amounting to insanity which might, in some circumstances,
be relevant to the issue of intent.0 2
It is arguable, that, not unlike the earlier cases of Flett and Hoodley, the
decision in Mulligan held that the defence of diminished responsibility was
not supportable on the evidence of the particular case, but that such a doc-
trine could be invoked if the circumstances warranted it. Topp maintains that
the facts in this case fall within the principle established in More.6 Surely
there are obvious differences between the two cases, including the nature of
GO (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 270, C.R.N.S. 179 (Ont. C.A.), afl'd [1977] 1 S.C.R.
612.
61 Topp, supra note 4, at 211.
0 Supra note 60, at 276 (C.C.C.), 185-86 (C.R.N.S.).
63 Topp, supra note 4, at 212.
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both the mental disorder and the offence charged. Although the latter differ-
ence would likely not constitute a valid reason for departing from the prin-
ciple, especially in the light of Blackmore, it is not clear whether or not the
"dissociative reaction" of the accused would justify a finding of diminished
responsibility. Certainly Martin J.A. sees this disorder as an "emotional
state" and not an abnormality of mind as provided in the English Homicide
Act.64 This is indeed a murky area over which even the experts may disagree.
The fact that the jury was not charged to at least consider the evidence per-
haps suggests a reluctance on the part of the Court to admit to the doctrine.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the defence of diminished
responsibility and denied the relevance of any abnormality of mind short of
the Code's definition of insanity in Chartrand v. The Queen." At issue was
whether the accused was insane. The Court held that since Chartrand, though
mentally ill with a psychopathic personality, could appreciate the nature and
quality of his act and that it was wrong, he could not succeed with the de-
fence of insanity. By way of obiter, de Grandpr6 J. wrote on behalf of the
Court:
What the witness adds on the subject of the inner pathological process cannot
be taken into consideration under our criminal legislation, which does not recog-
nize the diminished responsibility theory. 0
Chartrand is similar to Bigaouette in that both cases directly deny the exist-
ence of the defence of diminished responsibility in Canadian law. Moreover,
the defendants in both cases suffered from a psychopathic personality which
by itself would not support a plea of diminished responsibility even in Eng-
land and Scotland. It should be noted that Chartrand is not conclusive au-
thority as far as the application of diminished responsibility is concerned
since the issue of lack of intent was never raised.
7
In R. v. MelocheG8 the Quebec Court of Appeal accepted the argument
presented by defence counsel that the accused "had never formed the specific
required intent to commit murder under section 212(a)."O The court de-
clared admissible the testimony of the doctors who would have said at trial
that Meloche had a reaction of self-destruction in stress situations. This evi-
dence supported the accused's claim that he was going to his place of em-
ployment to commit suicide and not to kill his bosses. Citing R. v. Lupien7
0
and R. v. Kuzmack,7x Brossard J.A. concluded that acceptance of such evi-
dence by the jury may have led to a conviction for manslaughter instead of
murder. The case is unclear as to the true nature of the accused's state of
64 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, s. 2(l) (U.K.).
O5 [19771 1 S.C.R. 314, 64 D.L.R. (3d) 145, 26 C.C.C. (2d) 417.
GOld. at 318 (S.C.R.), 148 (D.L.R.), 420 (C.C.C.).
67 Supra note 40, at 204.
68 (1975), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 184 (Que. C.A.).
69 Id. at 189.
70 [1970] S.C.R. 263, (1969), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 9 C.R.N.S. 165.
71 [1955] S.C.R. 292, 111 C.C.C. 1, 20 C.R. 377.
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mental weakness. Significantly, Meloche invoked the concept of specific in-
tent that is characteristic of the drunkenness defence.
The most recent decision by the Supreme Court that may be seen to
touch upon the diminished responsibility issue is MacDonald v. The Queen.72
This case involved an appeal by a youth from a conviction of robbery, or
assault with intent to steal. The defence at trial was that the accused's mental
disorder, described as "adjustment reaction of adolescence," negated his
"capacity to form specific intent." The court recognized the relevance of such
evidence to the question of guilt and stated "it is impossible to conclude that
the trial Judge was unaware of the centrality of intent to which the evidence
of the psychiatrist was addressed.173 It is not clear whether the judgment was
referring to a specific-general intent dichotomy such as that used in the de-
fence of drunkenness. It is certain, however, that in contrast to its decision in
Chartrand the previous year, the Supreme Court in MacDonald did not deny
the relevance of mental disorder short of the Code's definition of insanity
to the issue of criminal liability.
74
R. v. Baltzer75 appears to allow in through the back door a type of defence
that Chartrand barred at the front. This case concerned an accused suffering
from schizophrenia who was charged with murder. The Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal held that evidence of mental illness not amounting to the Code's
definition of insanity was relevant to the issue of whether the accused had the
mental capacity to formulate the specific intent. If the jury, having deter-
mined what was in the accused's mind at the time of the act, found that
Baltzer was incapable of forming the specific intent to murder, then a man-
slaughter verdict was appropriate. This is perhaps the most outright accept-
ance of the defence of diminished responsibility in Canadian case law to date.
Yet, somewhat ludicrously, Mr. Justice MacDonald commented: "I want to
make it very clear that in saying the foregoing I am not bringing into our
jurisprudence the law of diminished responsibility. '76
In the cases of R. v. Browning 7 and R. v. Hilton78 the Ontario Court
of Appeal recognized the existence of a defence based upon a mental dis-
order not amounting to the legal definition of insanity to negate specific in-
tent. In the latter case Jessup J.A. held:
[E]vidence of mental illness or mental disorder falling short of insanity should
be considered along with all the other evidence in determining whether the
accused had the intent requisite for murder, and in the event that a jury enter-
tained a reasonable doubt on the issue of intent, the verdict would be one of
manslaughter.
79
72 [1977] 2 S.C.R. 665, (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3d) 649, 29 C.C.C. 257.
73 Id. at 675 (S.C.R.), 657 (D.L.R.), 265 (C.C.C.).
74 Supra note 40, at 204.
75 (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 561, 27 C.C.C. (2d) 118 (S.C. App. Div.).
76 Id. at 590 (N.S.R.), 141 (C.C.C.).
77 (1976), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 200 (Ont. C.A.).
78 (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 206 (Ont. C.A.).
70 Id. at 208.
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A similar principle was expressed in Browning by Gale C.J.O. who referred
to "a specific intent or ulterior intent set out in s. 212(a)." S It is not clear
upon which of the following two assumptions the rule upheld in these cases
is based. One assumption is that the jury, before considering the offence of
murder, will already have concluded from the totality of evidence, including
evidence of mental disorder, that a conviction for culpable homicide is ap-
propriate. Another assumption is that even if the accused, by reason of
mental disorder, may not have possessed the requisite mental element for
murder, he must still necessarily have possessed the mental component re-
quired for the included offence of manslaughter. According to Reynolds:
"[t]he latter assumption-that mental disorder is not in law capable of pro-
viding a defence to manslaughter--corresponds to the specific intent doctrine
in the defence of drunkenness." 81 In its effect it is similar to that of section 2
of the Homicide Act.
The most recently reported case in Canada dealing with the issue of
diminished responsibility is R. v. Lechasseur.82 In this decision the Quebec
Court of Appeal implicitly rejected the contention of the trial judge that the
defence of diminished responsibility did not exist in Canada by holding that
psychiatric evidence of the accused's incapacity to formulate the specific in-
tent to murder was relevant to a possible verdict of manslaughter. The Court
quoted from More to support its proposition and referred also to the cases of
Browning and Hilton.
E. Nature of Diminished Responsibility in Canadian Case Law and Reasons
For Its Development
The above analysis supports the proposition that the doctrine of dimin-
ished responsibility exists in Canadian case law. The cases have certainly not
exemplified a monolithic approach to the concept. Indeed, some cases such as
Bigaouette and Chartrand deny the existence of the defence and others, in-
cluding Flett, Hoodley and Mulligan, are reluctant to apply it. A significant
number of cases, however, uphold a principle akin to the defence of dimin-
ished responsibility as it exists in England and Scotland without referring to
it by that name. For instance, from the viewpoint of the particular mental
disorder involved, the evidence in More, Blackmore and Baltzer would surely
support a plea of diminished responsibility in these jurisdictions. The mental
abnormality in the above-mentioned Canadian cases is of such a type as to
fall within the ambit of the English statutory definition and the Scottish
judge-made law. Other cases, such as Meloche and MacDonald, seem to
adopt the principle although the specific mental deficiencies involved do not
fit into the English and Scottish mould as readily as the above cases. Perhaps
the courts in Canada base their decision on the morality of the case as op-
posed to the psychiatric evidence. But whatever specific parallels can be
drawn between the Canadian criteria of mental illness short of insanity and
80 Supra note 77, at 202.
81 Supra note 40, at 201.
(1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 319 (Que. C.A.).
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that of established diminished responsibility jurisdictions, the essential fact
remains that, contrary to Topp's view, the doctrine does exist in Canada in
some form. To truly understand the nature of this concept as it is applied in
Canada, it is necessary to trace the reasons for its development in Canadian
case law.
The sudden appearance and widespread acceptance of the doctrine of
diminished responsibility was the result of a combination of factors. One
concern that may have affected earlier decisions such as More was the exist-
ence of capital punishment following a conviction for capital murder. The
relationship between criminal responsibility and sentencing is a complex and
difficult one, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper. But it is
noteworthy that during the time of the decision in More, the first case dealing
with the new "capital murder" section, the existence of capital punishment
was seen as an impetus for a change in the strict rules governing responsibil-
ity. The emotional impact of the issue is summed up by Cassells who wrote,
"[tihe conviction and hanging of an 'almost' insane prisoner can hardly be
described as a spectacle of which Man can be proud." It is difficult to
speculate on the degree of importance this issue played in More and subse-
quent decisions.84 Certainly the acceptance of the doctrine of diminished re-
sponsibility in cases involving offences not punishable by death suggests the
issue was of minimal influence in the development of the diminished respon-
sibility theory in Canada.
A more important reason for the adoption of diminished responsibility
is the increasing acceptance on the part of the courts of expert psychiatric
evidence when determining whether an accused has the requisite mental ele-
ment for a particular offence. This phenomenon has been labelled by Schiffer
as the "'psychiatization' of contemporary criminal law."85 Judgments like
More indicate a further continuation of the trend towards approaching the
whole problem of mental illness in relation to criminal liability in a much
more realistic manner.88 The courts have recognized that advances in medi-
cal science indicate that conditions of mind can exist which may significantly
affect the responsibility of the accused for his acts and further, that such
conditions do not necessarily fall within the legal definition of insanity as set
out in the Code.87 Just as there is no sharp division between a sound and an
unsound mind, the courts have recognized that there is not always a clear
demarcation between total responsibility for one's acts and no responsibility
at all. In recognizing that responsibility is not by nature an all or nothing
quality and that the statutory definition of insanity does not encompass a
significant number of mental illnesses, the Canadian courts have found the
need to introduce a new test of partial or diminished responsibility.
s Supra note 3, at 55.
s4 Supra note 1, at 87, 92; Weiler, The Supreme Court of Canada and the Doc-
trines of Mens Rea (1971), 49 Can. B. Rev. 280 at 338-40.
85 Schiffer, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Trial Process (Toronto: Butter-
worths, 1978) at 1.
86 Supra note 19, at 254.
87 Supra note 3, at 9.
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The acceptance by the courts of psychiatric evidence in assessing re-
sponsibility is part and parcel of a more significant change in judicial atti-
tudes toward the concept and proof of mens rea.88 Indeed it has already been
noted that the judiciary has significantly altered its view of the traditional
presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of
his or her acts. The following comments by Martin perhaps best exemplify
this modified approach by the courts:
The crucial problem is to determine what was in the particular accused's mind,
and in order to determine what was in his mind you have to look at his whole
personality, including any mental disorder or disturbance from which he may be
suffering, and the jury are entitled to have that evidence to consider along with
all the other evidence in determining whether or not the Crown has established
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did have the requisite state of mind.
This is altogether apart from the defence of insanity.8 9
The decisions in the cases that have been examined are in part the result of a
change in attitude as revealed in Martin's words.
Another factor in the development of diminished responsibility in Cana-
dian law has been the evolution during the past sixty years of the defence of
drunkenness. This evolution has affected the whole sphere of mens rea, Sev-
eral of the cases supporting the diminished responsibility doctrine have
borrowed such concepts as "capacity" and "specific intent" from the law
governing the defence of self-induced intoxication.
In R. v. George9 the Supreme Court distinguished between general and
specific intent in dealing with the defence of drunkenness. As the law has
developed, drunkenness resulting in incapacity to form a specific intent may
provide a defence to a charge where the offence involves a specific intent;
such drunkenness, however, cannot negate the general intent or ordinary
mens rea of an offence. Several cases apply this reasoning to situations where
the accused suffers from a mental abnormality short of insanity, holding that
the defendant could not form the specific intent necessary for certain offences.
The preceeding investigation into the reasons for the development of
the defence of diminished responsibility is an aid in determining the nature
of the concept as it exists in Canadian law. The cases considered reveal four
general approaches to the doctrine.
The traditional view that mental disorder is irrelevant unless it falls
within the Code's definition of insanity is supported by Bigaouette and
Chartrand. This conservative approach, rooted in the common law maxim of
presumed intent, has become untenable in recent years as greater emphasis
has been placed on the need for the Crown to prove all the elements of the
case.92
88 Supra note 40, at 188, 198.
89 Supra note 19, at 257; see also, Carter supra note 25, at 301.
9o Supra note 40, at 198.
91' [1960] S.C.R. 871, 128 C.C.C. 289, 34 C.R. 1. This case relied heavily on the
case of D.P.P. v. Beard, [1920] A.C. 279, [1920] All E.R. 21, 14 Cr. App. Rep. 159
(H.L.).
92 Supra note 40, at 205.
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A second perspective is that revealed in Flett, Hoodley and Mulligan.
These cases indicate a reluctance to apply the doctrine, perhaps out of a
fear of opening the floodgates to a deluge of such pleas, but suggest it may
exist nevertheless.
The third possible approach is the adoption of a "capacity to form
specific intent" test like that used in the defence of drunkenness. The cases of
Lechasseur and Baltzer clearly embrace this principle; the test has also been
influential in the reasoning in Meloche, Browning and Hilton. Its effect is to
reduce such crimes as murder, for example, to a lesser included offence, in
this case manslaughter. This approach is much like that outlined in section 2
of the English Homicide Act. The specific-general intent dichotomy has been
attacked by numerous commentators9 3 as anomalous and confusing. Indeed,
the House of Lords, in D.P.P. v. Majewski, 4 in effect admitted that such
a distinction was illogical but sound policy. It has been argued quite con-
vincingly by several critics 5 that though the specific-general intent dichotomy
may be sound policy regarding voluntary intoxication, it is illogical to apply
it to situations of lack of intent resulting from mental disorder. Majewski is
based on the premise that there is something blameworthy connected with
becoming dangerously drunk; however, there is surely no such fault con-
nected with being mentally disturbed.96
A fourth approach focuses upon the mental disorder of the accused as
one factor that, with all of the other relevant circumstances, should be taken
into account in determining whether the requisite mental element is present.
Depending upon the trier of fact's opinion of the state of mind of the de-
fendant at the relevant time, the operation of this principle could result in a
conviction for a lesser included offence or in a complete acquittal. This view
was intimated by Laskin C.J.C. in Macdonald and it can be argued that it is
consistent with the decisions in More, McMartin, Mitchell and Blackmore, as
well as being supported by several commentators.
97
F. Should The Defence Of Diminished Responsibility Be Codified
It has been suggested that the doctrine of diminished responsibility exists
in Canadian case law. The question remains whether this defence should be
codified. Clearly this issue invokes a multitude of related concerns. These
include: the appropriate definition and mechanics of applying the defence of
diminished responsibility; 98 the disposition of convicted offenders found par-
93 Id. at 207, 208; see also, Gold, An Untrimmed Beard. The Law of Intoxication
as a Defence to a Criminal Charge (1976-77), 19 Crim. L.Q. 34.
94 [1977] A.C. 443, [1967] 2 All E.R. 142, (1976) 62 Cr. App. Rep. 262 (H.L.).
05 Supra note 85, at 155, 187; supra note 18 at 5.
0o Supra note 40, at 202.
97 Id. at 203; see also, supra note 19, at 257; Carter, supra note 25; lecture by
J.LI.J. Edwards, Automatism: Clinical Entity and Psychiatric Defence, to the Clarke
Institute of Psychiatry (February 13, 1980).
98 Topp, supra note 4, at 213-15.
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tially responsible for their acts;99 the aims of the criminal justice system;100
the justification and relative merits of rehabilitation, punishment and deter-
rence, including the advantages and disadvantages of imprisonment and treat-
ment for various classes of offenders; 101 the interpretation, application and
suggested alterations of the insanity defence of the Code; and the utility
and degree of success of the defence of diminished responsibility in other
jurisdictions. 0 2 Although these issues do exist and are important, an analysis
of them is beyond the ambit of this paper. From the viewpoint of such highly
cherished values in our legal process as certainty, uniformity and fairness,
however, a strong argument can be made for the introduction of the defence
of diminished responsibility into the Code. In addition, the reasons previous-
ly discussed for the development of the doctrine in the case law apply equally
to support the enactment of the defence in a statute.
The fact that one can trace at least four different approaches to the
question of mental illness which do not fall within the ambit of the Code's
definition of insanity indicates a lack of certainty and uniformity in this area
of the law. The courts in the various jurisdictions of the country have applied
a diversity of tests and the Supreme Court has failed to provide guidance.
Indeed, its last two decisions, Macdonald and Chartrand, are neither defini-
tive nor even particularly lucid.103 Although the Court in More supported
a test of diminished responsibility with regard to capital murder, the extent
of offences to which such a test applies and its consequences is uncertain.
Given the present state of the law in this area it is possible that all partici-
pants in the legal process-judge, jury, defence counsel, prosecutor, and the
accused-find themselves in a dubious, if not totally confused, position.
A statutory provision laying down what constitutes a mental state short of
insanity which affects responsibility and which the law recognizes either as a
partial or total defence to all or some offences would provide more certainty
and uniformity to the whole question of diminished responsibility.
To avoid injustice to the accused, the criminal system reflects a deliber-
ate policy decision to not hold individuals guilty of wrongdoing if they
lack the requisite mental elements of the offence. The legislature has adopted
99 Edwards, "Diminished Responsibility-A Withering Away, of the Concept of
Criminal Responsibility?" Essays in Criminal Science ed. Mueller (New Jersey: Roth-
man, 1961) at 317, 331, 334-35; Williams, supra note 9, at 624-25; supra note 14, at
104-105.
100 C.L.R.C., Mental Disorder in the Criminal Process (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1976), at 2-3; Edwards, id. at 337.
101 C.L.R.C., id. at 23; Edwards, supra note 99, at 337; supra note 85, at 295-
98; Del Buono, Mental Disorder: A Crime (1976), 18 Can. J. of Criminology and
Corrections 502; Swadron, Criminal Responsibility-A Secondary Problem (1962), 11
Chitty's L.J. 274 at 275-76.
1o2 Supra note 3, at 12; Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (4th ed. London: Clowes
& Sons, 1978) at 176, 181. For statistical data regarding the application of s. 2 of the
Homicide Act in England, see supra note 14, at 96-97, 104-105; see also supra note 1
at 88.
1o Supra note 40, at 204.
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certain provisions negating or reducing criminal responsibility under circum-
stances where the accused suffers from a mental disorder rendering him or
her unable to satisfy the level of mens rea required for the crime. Specifically,
section 16 regarding insanity and section 216 concerning infanticide address
this issue. Evidently Parliament has recognized the strong influence of mental
disorder on responsibility in the limited cases of the insane offender and of
the female during post-natal depression. It can be argued that from the view-
point of fairness and uniformity, the theoretical bases underlying these sec-
tions should extend to include all offenders.
One may argue that mental disorder not within section 16 of the Code
is relevant to the basic issue of proving mens rea' 4 and that it is unnecessary
to codify such a widely-accepted principle. Surely the requirement of mens rea
is one of the main threads that runs through the criminal law and needs no
codification. The importance of mental illness in relation to the proof of
mens rea, however, is by no means a clearly established criminal law maxim.
For a system concerned with stability and predictability, it would indeed
seem logical and fair to dispel the uncertainties regarding the relevancy of
mental illness short of insanity by introducing in the Code provisions for
diminished responsibility.
When advocating the codification of a new defence, one is inevitably
confronted by problems of definition. The criticisms of the English test for
diminished responsibility as worded in section 2 of the Homicide Act have
been noted. It is a difficult task to draft a workable definition to satisfy both
psychiatrists and lawyers. At the same time the fact that a concept is difficult
to define is not reason to avoid trying altogether. Surely some rational guide-
lines as to the method of determining the nature of diminished responsibility
and whether it applies to a particular accused are better than no guidelines
at all. The question of diminished responsibility, like insanity, rests on the
specific set of facts in each case. But, as with insanity, some direction as to
the legal position regarding the concept is preferable to an approach moulded
totally by judicial discretion.
Traditionally the courts have been accused of being conservative and
slow to recognize changes in society. In the area of diminished responsibility,
however, it is Parliament that has been guilty of inactivity and the courts
have had to find ways to circumvent such apathy. For instance, in comment-
ing on the decision in More, Nemiroff noted that "the Supreme Court of
Canada is one step ahead of the Legislature."' 5 Surely there is a lesson for
Parliament to learn from this observation. If the highest court in the country
is responding favourably to the growing prominence of psychology and psy-
chiatry by considering an accused's mental condition in relation to his or her
criminal responsibility, perhaps Parliament should do likewise. By enacting
a provision dealing with diminished responsibility, the Legislature will be
keeping abreast of the changes in the courts, and in society as a whole.
104 Edwards, supra note 99, when asked about the existence of the defence of
diminished responsibility in Canada.
'05 Supra note 49, at 179.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Whether or not we choose to acknowledge it, the doctrine of diminished
responsibility exists in the Canadian criminal process. By looking to the laws
of Scotland and England as examples, Canadian courts have recently im-
ported into our judicial system a concept of diminished responsibility not
unlike that found in these two countries. Indeed, an analysis of some leading
criminal cases of the past few decades indicates a trend supporting the recog-
nition of mental abnormality short of the Code's definition of insanity as a
relevant factor in determining criminal responsibility. The traditional com-
mon law maxim of presumed intent has been somewhat overshadowed as
the courts have become increasingly more concerned with probing what was
present in the mind of the particular accused at the time of the alleged act.
From an initial reluctance to admit to the concept, to the acceptance and
expansion of the doctrine in More and subsequent cases, the courts have
indicated a variety of approaches to the defence of diminished responsibility.
The development of the doctrine in the case law was clearly a response to
such factors as the growing prominence and recognition of psychiatric evi-
dence and deep-seated changes in the approach to the concept and proof of
mens rea, particularly in regard to the defence of drunkenness. Such factors
were part of a shifting view of the whole concept of responsibility. Having
realized that responsibility is a matter of degree, the judiciary has adopted a
more humane and just approach through the incorporation into Canadian
criminal law of diminished responsibility. It now remains an open challenge
to Parliament to keep in step with the courts and introduce the doctrine into
the Code. Only then will the law governing this area be more certain, uni-
form and fair.
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